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STUDENT NOTE
UNDUE INFLUENCE AS AFFECTING WILLS IN
WEST VIRGINIA
An inquiry into the field of undue influence will show that,
while the phrase "undue influence" is comparatively recent legal
terminology, the idea of invalidity of testaments through im-
moderate importunity antedates even the Statute of Wills in 1540,
and is probably of civil law origin.1 Despite this long incubation,
the concept cannot be precisely defined nor stated in terms of a
general rule. The inquiry must rather be a factual investigation
into the peculiar circumstances of each case.
Any analysis of the problem must involve a classification of
the facts into two categories, that is, a separation of the operative
from the evidentiary facts of undue influence. 2 Although our court
does not make this distinction sharply, a close analysis of the cases
will disclose that some such factual separation has been the mo-
tivation of the decisions.
More obscure, perhaps, than the classification of operative and
evidentiary facts by the court is the further separation of some
evidentiary facts into what niay be called positive and negative
factors. The negative factors are those elements which, though in-
fluential, arA not exercised improperly, and consequently have no
effect on the problem. A negative factor may be the kindness or
affection of the principal devisee toward the testator, or some vir-
tue of such devisee.8 A positive factor, on the other hand, is an
element conducive to an improper influence such as the practice of
artificial affection and kindness. What is improper influence in
every case is not clear. However, it is not so much a question of
whether the influence is wrongful or illegal, or whether the acts
constituting influence were done with intent to influence, as it is
a question of whether or not the testator would have done what
he did had the influence been removed.
SwiNBuRNE, WILLs (7th ed. 1793) §§ 2, 3, 4. REPPY & TOMPKINS, HisToRY
OF WILLS (1928) 21, 22.
2 2 PATTERSON, CASES ON CONTRACTS (1935) 36 n.
3 Kerr v. Lunsford, 31 W. Va. 659, 8 S. E. 493 (1888) ; see Nicholas et a?. v.
Kershner, 20 W. Va. 251 (1882); of. Deck v. Deck, 106 Wis. 470, 82 N. W.
293 (1900).
1 .... Solicitations, however importunate, cannot of themselves constitute
undue influence; for though these may have a constraining effect, they do not
destroy the testator's power to freely dispose of his estate." Trost v. Dingler,
118 Pa. St. 259, 270, 12 AtI. 296, 4 Am. St. Rep. 593 (1888). A man has a
right, by fair persuasion, to induce another to make a will, and even to make
it in his favor, Miller v. Miller, 3 S. & R. 267, 8 Am. Dec. 651 (Pa. 1817).
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The Operative Fact. The element of dominance is, without
doubt, the operative fact of undue influence. Dominance may be
gained by inordinate flattery, hypnotic stratagem, or some other
influence which has overpowered the testator's volition without
convincing his judgment. It is more or less synonymous with un-
due influence, and perhaps more properly could be defined in terms
of result or effect. Nevertheless, for a proper understanding of
the term "undue influence" and its retinue of lay misconceptions,
we must consider dominance as a factor and not a result, because
its presence or absence is the test by which we determine whether
the will in question shall fail or stand.
The West Virginia court has stated many times that to set
aside a will on the ground of undue influence, it must appear that
the influence was such as to "wholly destroy the free agency of
the testator at the time the will was made." 4 Unless the wish of
the testator has been subdued and displaced through some influ-
ence which he bas not the power to resist, it cannot be logically
argued that the will is not his will and thus invalidate it on that
ground.
In Stewart v. Lyons,5 the court quotes with approval the fol-
lowing statement: "The criterion is, is the influence irresistible?'
If so, the will is not the instrument of the testator, and cannot
stand. If it is not, the influence is not undue and its existence is
immaterial, even though the testator did in fact yield to it."
In Snedeker v. Rulong, after a summary of past decisions, the
court concludes that, "mental weakness, attachment or love for, and
desire to gratify the wishes of a beneficiary, are not enough to over-
throw a will, if the free agency of the testator, at the time of the
execution of the will, be not overcome by undue influence; and that
such undue influence must have amounted to such force or coercion
as to overcome such free agency." 7
If the testator has been dominated by the volition of another
as to the whole will, the entire testament is invalid. If it appears
that only a part of the will was so induced, the tainted part alone
4 Forney v. Ferrell, 4 W. Va. 729 (1871) ; Snedeker v. Rulong, 69 W. Va.
223, 71 S. E. 180 (1911); Payne v. Payne, 97 W. Va. 627, 125 S. E. 818 (1924);
Parramore v. Taylor, 11 Gratt. 220, 238 (Va. 1854); Ebert v. Ebert, 200 S. E.
831 (W. Va. 1938).
5 54 W. Va. 665, 678, 47 S. E. 442 (1903).
G Apparently what is meant by the question is whether the influence was or
was not resisted in the particular case. The courts use a subjective test, be-
cause an influence that is "irresistible" to one may have absolutely no effect
upon another.
7 69 W. Va. 223, 227, 71 S. E. 180 (1911).
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may be expunged and the remainder of the will be permitted to
stand-8
The Evidentiary Facts. The method by which a testator is
deprived of his free agency and thus dominated, or the reasons why
he is more susceptible to domination, may be regarded as the evi-
dentiary fact or facts. Though indicative of the all controlling in-
gredient, dominance, it appears from the cases that the court treats
such facts as merely evidentiary and not per se sufficient to frus-
trate the will and bring about its nullification. Although such facts
are numberless, a few examples will be sufficient to illustrate the
proposition.
Where it is shown that the testator lacks testamentary capacity,
it is obviously unnecessary to inquire into the question of undue
influence. However, testamentary capacity may be of such low
order as to make the testator an easy prey to harassing circum-
ventions. Such debility is not of itself indicative of dominance, or
even of undue influence. 9 It is but an evidentiary fact, lessening
the quantum of influence, where influence is shown, necessary to
establish the operative fact of dominance.
Physical weakness, like mental infirmity, is one of the condi-
tions to be considered when undue influence is charged. However,
it is clear that although it may cause the court to be more alert to
the possible presence of dominance, it is not an operative fact. The
West Virginia court clearly demonstrates that it considers physical
weakness but an evidentiary fact in Payne v. Payne.1 There it
was said that "If undue influence is charged, the testator's weak-
ened physical condition is to be considered, but the undue influ-
ence must be shown to be such as to wholly destroy the free agency
of the testator and to substitute the will of another for his."
However the courts may admire the rule of equality in the
disposition of the property of a testator, they are bound to give an
unequal or unjust will full effect if the testator was conpetent and
free from irresistible importunity. In Couch v. Eastham it was
said, "When a testator has the legal capacity to make a will, he
has the legal right to make an unequal, unjust or unreasonable
will."'" In Ebert v. Ebert, Judge Fox states that a testator of
sound mind has a right to dispose of his property in such manner
s Gay v. Gay, 74 W. Va. 800, 83 S. E. 75 (1914); Lyons v. Campbell, 88 Ala.
462, 7 So. 250 (1889); Harrison's Appeal, 48 Conn. 202 (1880).
9 Snedeker v. Rulong, 69 W. Va. 223, 227, 71 S. E. 180 (1911); Stewart
v. Lyons, 54 W. Va. 665, 676, 47 S. E. 442 (1903).
10 97 W. Va. 627, syl. 2, 125 S. E. 818 (1924).
2129 W. Va. 784, 790, 3 S. E. 23 (1887).
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as he may desire, and, " ... . in the absence of a showing of fraud
or undue influence such as amounts to a substitution of the will of
some other person for his own, the courts will not disturb such
disposition of his property as he may make, however unjust and in-
equitable it may appear to others. " 2
The unlawful sex relations of the testator and the principal
devisee will not give rise to a presumption of undue influence. The
immoral influence which the relation gives the mistress over her
paramour will perhaps cause the court to scrutinize the facts sur-
rounding the will more closely, but the cases are uniform in hold-
ing that this unlawful relation will not avoid a will which is the
offspring of the testator's own volition.13  In Stewart v. Lyons, the
West Virginia court said that an unlawful sexual relation is "only
a circumstance to be considered along with other matters.'
14
If the provisions of the will were induced by extreme kind-
ness and attention to the testator on the part of the principal de-
visee, that will not constitute influence which is undue if no im-
position is practiced amounting to a control of the will of the de-
visor." If a wife by her virtues has gained an ascendency over
her husband to such a degree that his affections are riveted to her
to the exclusion of his children, it is not a reason for impeaching
his will in her favor."' The same is true of the influence of a child
by reason of confidence reposed in him by the parent, or because
he has been attentive and kind while the other children have been
thankless and ungrateful. 17  Influence gained by kindness and
affection would seem to be a negative factor so long as the kind-
ness and affection are sincere. It is natural to suppose that the
testator would wish to reward a person who has been thoughtful
and considerate of his welfare; such a testamentary reward, in
fact, expresses the will of the testator rather than the contrary.
On the other hand, if the kindness or affection is artificial and
practiced with intent to delude, it is clear that a gross imposition
12 200 S. E. 831, 836 (W. Va. 1938) ; of. Parramore v. Taylor, 11 Gratt. 220
(Va. 1854).
13 ROOD, WVILLS (2d ed. 1926) § 182; Smith v. Henline, 174 Iln. 184, 51 N.
E. 227 (1898).
14 54 W. Va. 665, 679, 47 S. E. 442 (1903) ; of. Porsehet v. Porschet, 82 Ky.
93 (1884).
1- Kerr v. Lunsford, 31 W. Va. 659, 8 S. E. 493 (1888); of. Roberts v.
Clemens, 202 Pa. St. 198, 51 AtI. 758 (1902).
20 Ebert v. Ebert, 200 S. E. 831 (W. Va. 1938) ; Small v. Small, 4 Me. 220,
16 Am. Dec. 253 (1826); Armstrong v. Armstrong, 63 Wis. 162, 23 N. W. 407
(1885).
17 Thompson v. Ish, 99 Mo. 160, 12 S. E. 510, 17 Am. St. Rep. 552 (1889);
Furlong v. Carraher, 108 Iowa 492, 79 N. W. 277 (1899).
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has been perpetrated; it is unnatural to suppose that the testator
would wish to reward such an imposter. Influence gained by such
hypocrisy thus ceases to be a negative factor and becomes a positive
evidentiary ingredient; if the testator's volition is thereby con-
trolled, the will may be set aside.
The fact that the testator executed other wills prior to the one
offered for probate, in which the principal devisee of his last testa-
ment was not so favorably considered, is a circumstance to be
studied, perhaps with suspicion, but will not in any sense be con-
trolling.
Conclusion. From the foregoing cases it would seem that the
West Virginia court has been diligently careful in avoiding a mix-
ture of the several issues involved where undue influence has been
charged against the validity of a will. In every instance, the court
has reiterated that before the influence exerted on the testator will
be sufficient to nullify his testamentary act, it must be of such a
degree as to control his volition and induce him to do what other-
wise he would not have done; in short, the testator must have been
dominated.
To reach a conclusion as to the operative fact, the court will
consider the mental and physical capacity of the testator, his rela-
tions with the principal devisee, the equities of the will, the age
and sex of the testator, the means of coercing the testator's volition,
the time of executing the will, and prior testaments. In brief, all
the relevant circumstances and conditions surrounding the execu-
tion of the will are to be considered. But in conformity with the
general view taken in other jurisdictions, our court has demon-
strated with constancy that it regards such relevant circumstances
and conditions as of evidentiary value only.
C. E. G.
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